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Abstract.  In  this  article,  I  address  two  different  kinds  of 
equivocations  in  reading  Leibniz’s  fictional  infinite  and  infinitesimal. 
These  equivocations  form  the  background  of  a  reductive  reading  of 
infinite  and  infinitesimal  fictions  either  as  ultimately  finite  or  as 
something  whose  status  can  be  taken  together  with  any  other 
mathematical object as such. The first equivocation is the association of 
a foundation of infinitesimals with their ontological status. I analyze this 
equivocation  by  criticizing  the  logicist  influence  on  20th  century 
Anglophone  reception  of  the  syncategorematical  infinite  and 
infinitesimal. The second equivocation is the association of the rigor of 
mathematical  demonstration  with  the  problem  of  the  admissibility  of 
infinite  or  infinitesimal  terms.  I  analyze  this  by  looking  at  Leibniz’s 
constructive  method  and  apagogic  argument  style  in  his  quadrature 
method. In  treating  these equivocations, I  critique  some  assumptions 
that underlie the reductive reading of Leibniz’s fictionalism concerning 
infinite  and  infinitesimals.  In  turn,  I  suggest  that  these  infinitesimal 
“fictions”  pointed  to  a  problematic  within  Leibniz’s  work  that  was 
conceived and reconsidered in Leibniz’s work from a range of different 
contexts and methods.  
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Introduction 
  Through the painstaking work of many archivists, historians and philosophers 
in the last few decades, a great deal of what was unclear about Leibniz’s infinitesimals 
has been cleared up. Series VII of the Akademie edition has since 1990 made available 
works that demonstrate not only the degree of Leibniz’s involvement in a wide range 
of mathematical problems but also a deeper appreciation of the complexity of his 
methodology in the development of the differential calculus. This capacity to look 
more  closely  at  Leibniz’s  mathematical  methodology  is  important  precisely  in 
understanding the concrete aspects of these “fictional” infinitesimals beyond the mere 
determination of these terms as syncategorematical; a certainty that one could already 
                                                 
  Berlin-Brandenburgische  Akademie  der  Wissenschaften,  Emserstrasse  93,  12051  Berlin, 
email: tzuchien.tho@gmail.com  
 
 
Society and Politics                                                              Vol. 6, No. 2 (12)/November 2012 
 
71 
 
grasp  from  his  New  Essays  on  Human  Understanding  and  other  previously  available 
correspondences.   
  What remains unclear, despite all that has been revealed, is the meaning of 
this syncategorematical infinite, the role that it plays within Leibniz’s mathematical 
reflections and its importance for his larger metaphysical and scientific considerations. 
As many interpreters have noted, a syncategorematical use of the infinitesimal is, as 
Leibniz himself seems to suggest, the use of an expression that can be reduced to 
more standard terms. As Leibniz says to Pinsson in a letter of 29 August 1701,”[I]n 
lieu of the infinite or infinitely small, we take quantities as great or as small as it is 
required so that the error would be less than the given error such that we do not differ 
from the style of Archimedes except in the expressions [….].”1 In this view, Leibniz’s 
use of infinitesimals is an “abrégé” that substitutes a longer classical or Archimedean 
expression.2 This view is correct but limited. It is correct, as we shall examine in more 
detail below, because Leibniz’s methodology does not admit any actual infinite or 
infinitesimal term. It is however limited insofar as a merely reductionist reading of the 
infinitesimal to the finite unfortunately obscures the meaning and complexity of the 
role of the syncategorematic infinitesimals in Leibniz’s work.   
  Reductionist readings of Leibniz’s infinitesimal fictionalism are largely made 
to vindicate Leibniz from the charges of a lack rigorousness and, even worse, of 
contradiction  in  his  admission  of  infinitesimals  in  mathematics  and  his  use  of 
infinitary notions in his metaphysics. Part of this vindication begins by noting that, in 
his early years (pre-1672), Leibniz did entertain a position, inspired by Hobbes, of 
actual  infinitesimals  in  the  form  of  indivisible  parts  of  motion.  Through  his 
mathematical maturation during his séjour Parisien (1672 to 1676), he gave up these 
youthful mistakes and developed the basis for his differential calculus through the 
notion of a non-actual, syncategorematic infinitesimal. It is in this drive to absolve 
Leibniz from a youthful position and whatever mistakes his reception might have 
imputed to him however that we face the danger of over-emphasizing this rejection of 
actual  infinitesimals  such  as  to  simply  reduce  the  syncategorematic  infinite  or 
infinitesimal into the finite.  
  I do not wish to suggest that we can read Leibniz’s infinitesimals as anything 
but ideal, syncategorematical or fictional. Simply opposing these characterizations of 
the infinitesimals to the menace of an actual infinite or infinitesimal however does not 
allow us much insight into the complexity of Leibniz’s reflections in this domain. 
Leibniz’s  infinitesimal  fictionalism  is  clearly  more  complex  than  what  a  reductive 
reading  can  account  for.  There  are  three  key  places  where  this  reductive  reading 
encounters its limits. First, in Leibniz’s metaphysics it is plain to see that there is a 
dissymmetry between his thesis of a concrete infinite division of the parts of nature3 
and his rejection of an actual infinitesimal sum, quantity or magnitude. However, the 
concrete infinite nature of the world maintains a relation with the admissibility of 
infinitesimals in mathematics in an indirect way through the principle of continuity 
that goes beyond the limits of a reductive reading of  the infinitesimal. Second, in the 
domain of mathematics, Leibniz’s famous epistolary exchanges with Nieuwentijt over 
the  nature  of  higher-order  derivatives  reveals  that  he  affirms  these  higher-order  
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differentials,  a  notion  that  could  be  generalized  as  dx
n  ≠  0.4  As  Leibniz  himself 
declares to Nieuwentijt, “Therefore I accept not only infinitely small lines, such as 
dxdx, dydy, dxdy. And I accept cubes and other higher powers and products as well, 
primarily  because  I  have  found  these  useful  for  reasoning  and  invention.”5  This 
further development of the structure of these orders of infinitesimal terms at least 
suggests  that  a  mere  reduction  of  the  infinitesimal  into  the  finite  is  not  the  only 
meaning of the qualification of them as “fictional.”6 Finally, in the domain of natural 
science, we can also point to Leibniz’s use of infinitesimal terms in the treatment of 
actual things in the different writings of his Dynamics project. This is seen most clearly 
in the Specimen Dynamicum when he makes a direct association between the measure of 
dead force and infinitesimal magnitude, albeit with the important caveat that it is a 
“fictional” one. In none of these cases are we entertaining the notion of an actual 
infinitesimal,  but  what  is  clear  is  that  there  are  a  number  of  contexts  in  which 
Leibniz’s fictional infinitesimals play a role which are not easily explained by a mere 
reduction of the fictional infinitesimal to finite terms.  
  By pointing to these three areas of difficulty, I am not proposing to resolve 
them here. The aim of this article is thus only to provide a critique of this reductionist 
reading by pointing to two equivocal assumptions that this view is based on. The first 
equivocation is the association of a foundation of infinitesimals with their ontological 
or meta-mathematical status. Here, I take up Hide Ishiguro’s important evaluation of 
the syncategorematical infinitesimal and provide a critique of her reductive reading by 
showing the ultimate emptiness of these claims. I then provide a short explanation for 
the historical reasons for this equivocation that is tied to a general equivocation in 
mathematics and the philosophy of mathematics in the 20th century. The second 
equivocal  assumption  that  I  will  critique  is  the  association  of  the  admissibility  of 
infinitesimal terms in mathematics and the rigor of demonstration. I will examine the 
separability  of  these  two  constraints  facing  Leibniz’s  mathematical  work  in  an 
evaluation of his De quadratura arithemetica circuli ellipseos et hyperbolae cujus corollarium est 
trigonometria  sine  tabulis  (1675).7  Through  an  examination  of  these  forms  of 
equivocation  at  work  in  a  reductive  understanding  of  Leibniz ’s  infinitesimal 
fictionalism, I hope to promote a more dynamic view of Leibniz’s relationship with 
fictional infinitesimals; one that should be sought in a range of different contexts only 
one of which is his rejection of actual infinity and infinitesimals.  
 
Infinitesimal Fictionalism in The Context of Self-Justification 
Although  the  initial  developments  of  Leibniz’s  differential  calculus  were 
already  developed  in  his  period  of  maturation  in  his  séjour  Parisien,  notably  the 
Quadratura, it was not until much later that this project took an explicit public form in 
Nova Methodus pro maximis et minimis, itemque tangentibus, et singulare pro illis calculi genus 
(1684) and De Geometria Recondita et analysi indivisibilium atque infinitorum (1686). These 
public expositions elicited opponents and admirers alike and Leibniz became involved 
in  a  series  of  epistolary  exchanges  (with  Cluver,  Nieuwentijt)  and  public  debates 
around  the  French Royal Academy  of  Sciences,  the very  institution  for  which he 
originally  prepared  his  Quadratura  (in  1675)  as  a  means  to  gain  membership.8  We  
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should then understand these debates as an episode of justification for the differential 
calculus. They are then different in nature to both his initial turn to the terminology of 
the “fictional” infinitesimal and the actual development of the calculus itself.  
  It is in this later context that we find Leibniz using the expression “well-
founded fiction” as a clarification of his own position in a battle where he was not 
directly a combatant. Leibniz communicated to P. Varignon in 20 June 1702:  
 
Between you and me, I think Fontenelle […] was joking when he said 
he would derive metaphysical elements from our calculus. To tell the 
truth,  I  myself  am  far  from  convinced  that  our  infinites  and 
infinitesimals should be considered as anything other than ideals, or 
well-founded fictions.9  
 
From far away Hanover, Leibniz was asked to clarify questions from a heated 
debate that was going on in Paris sparked by the first textbook on the calculus, G. de 
L’Hôpital’s Analyse des infiniment petits (1696). The wider accessibility of the calculus led 
to a debate between the proponents of the differential calculus (L’Hôpital, Varignon, 
Fontenelle) and the opponents (Rolle, la Hire, Galloys).10 Most notably, M. Rolle’s Du 
nouveau systeme de l’infini (1703) took L’Hôpital’s book as a target and laid down a 
series of attacks that would forecast the eventual attacks of infinitesimal analysis made 
by Berkeley a few decades later. Although not a neutral observer, the terms of debate 
over the calculus were in some sense already out of Leibniz’s hands. In this context, 
Leibniz  often  played  a  very  conservative  role,  prudentially  maneuvering  between 
defending the method of the differential calculus that had come under significant 
attack and playing down its wilder implications. In the case of this letter to Varignon, 
the prudential use of “fiction” was rhetorically directed toward the ways in which he 
felt his theory was over-extended, in this case by Fontenelle, into domains where it did 
not belong. While one can certainly sense the deflationary meaning of Leibniz’s use of 
fiction here, this is far from being the whole story.  
  In fact what Leibniz explains in his letters to Varignon provides some reason 
for understanding a different meaning of this deflationary attitude toward the use of 
infinitesimals. Although the explicit debate in the French Royal Academy between 
Varignon and Rolle concerned the admissibility of infinitesimal quantities, magnitudes 
and the like, Leibniz simply asserted the proper borders of this debate. In his view, 
some of Varignon’s opponents in the French context had simply misunderstood the 
prudential metaphysical scope of the calculus. In his January 1701 letter to Varignon, 
Leibniz  expressed  his  belief  that  someone  that  he  held  in  high  regard  like  Abbé 
Gallois only spoke against it because, “Perhaps his opposition comes only from his 
belief  that  we  have  founded  our  demonstration  of  this  calculus  on  metaphysical 
paradoxes  which  I  myself  believe  that  we  can  very  well  discard.”11  Leibniz  also 
remarks  here  on  his  separate  debate  with  Clüver  and  Nieuwentijt,  marking  a 
distinction between debates surrounding the metaphysical implications or assumptions 
attributed falsely to the calculus and the debates internal to the mathematical use of 
fictional  infinitesimals.  We  can  summarize  Leibniz’s  position  here  in  a  phrase  
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eventually redacted from his 2 February 1702 letter to Varignon, “[I]t is unnecessary 
to make mathematical analysis depend on metaphysical controversies or to make sure 
that there are lines in nature that are infinitely small in a rigorous sense in contrast to 
our ordinary lines, or as a result that there are lines infinitely greater than our ordinary 
ones.”12   
  We  should  be  careful,  as  Leibniz  is,  in  clearly  separating  the  debates 
concerning  the  metaphysics  of  the  infinite  and  the  mathematical  use  of  fictional 
infinite and infinitesimal terms. We should also be careful to understand that the 
separation of these two domains does not directly resolve the problems within each 
domain. That is, even if we could have a full grasp of Leibniz’s metaphysics of the 
infinite and infinitesimal, we should still have much trouble in seeing how Leibniz 
introduces their use within mathematical practice. As I will continue to argue in the 
following, it is the insufficient distinction between the two kinds of domains and the 
confounding of the standards of argumentation required in each domain that leads to 
confusion.   
 
What Is Unequivocal About Fictional Infinitesimals? 
Before looking more closely at the two domains of equivocation below, I 
want to first clear up what is not equivocal in Leibniz’s treatment of the infinite and 
infinitesimal. There are a number of elements in Leibniz’s work that can help cement 
this non-equivocal baseline from which to venture into more complex matters. The 
definition of the mathematical infinite and  infinitesimal as syncategorematic is the 
most important aspect to be treated here. In Leibniz’s youth, evidenced by Hypothesis 
physica nova (1671), there was a period of experimentation with the notion of real 
indivisibles  understood  as  infinitesimal  magnitudes  in  the  extended  continuum  of 
motion.  As  we  have  already  mentioned,  Leibniz’s  mathematical  transformation  in 
Paris from 1672 to 1676 changed all that. Early in this period, and before his work on 
the  calculus,  Leibniz  had  already  rejected  actual  infinite  measure.  In his  notes  on 
Galileo’s Discourses and Mathematical Demonstrations Relating to the Two New Sciences in 
1672,  Leibniz  drew  the  following  conclusion  from  Galileo’s  insights,  one  that  he 
thought the latter should have been forced to accept given his commitments. Leibniz 
remarked, “Infinity itself is nothing, i.e. that it is not one and not a whole.”13 In his 
texts towards the end of his Parisian period, Leibniz began to employ notions like 
“fiction” to describe his infinitesimals. This terminological turn coincides with a key 
conceptual turn towards the notion of a syncategorematic infinitesimal. Although we 
can attribute this to Leibniz since 1675, for reasons of clarity, we can turn to his 
elaborated use of this specific notion of the infinite and infinitesimal in his New Essays 
on Human Understanding (1703), his lengthy response to Locke’s Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding.  
  In his section “On the infinite” in the New Essays, Leibniz aims to sidestep a 
direct confrontation with Locke on the relation of the infinite and its relation with 
sensible qualities or intuitions.  Instead, Leibniz focuses on the idea of the infinite 
itself. In this rich debate, I move directly to what Leibniz saw as Locke’s mistake. As 
Leibniz saw it, Locke made the mistake of understanding the finite and infinite as  
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modes of quantity. Arguing from the perspective of the very concept of the infinite, 
Leibniz puts it very clearly in the start of his commentary of Locke’s “infinity” that,  
 
Properly speaking, it is true that there are an infinity of things, that is 
to say that there are always more than can be assigned. But, there is 
nothing as an infinite number nor a line or other infinite quantity, if 
we take them for true totalities, as it is easy to show. The schools 
wanted, due to this, to admit a syncategorematic infinite, as they say, 
and not a categorematic infinite. The true infinite, in rigor, is nothing 
but in the absolute, that before any composition, and is not formed 
by the addition of parts.14  
 
Leibniz’s argument here moves away from thinking the finite and infinite as 
modes of quantity by laying out an important conceptual distinction between three 
senses of the infinite that he mobilized to help clarify the framework of the debate: 
the categorematic, the syncategorematic and the hypercategorematic. Briefly put, the 
categorematic infinite is the infinite as a number, a unity or mathematical entity. This 
categorematic infinite is contradictory once it is posed, since there will always be a 
number that can be added to produce a greater sum. The syncategorematic infinite is 
an infinite that posits that, insofar as there is no greatest number, there will always be 
a greater number than any given finite quantity. For precision’s sake, I will draw from 
R. Arthur’s description that, “To assert an infinity of parts syncategorematically is to 
say that for any finite number x that you choose to number the parts, there is a 
number of parts y greater than this: (x)(y)Fx->y>x, with Fx=x is finite, and x and y 
numbers.”15  There  is  finally  a  hypercategorematic  infinite  that  is  invoked  in  this 
passage, a “true infinite” which is “nothing but in the absolute.” This is the infinite in 
its absolute sense, the infinity of God or an infinity without parts. As Leibniz suggests 
in the above, the syncategorematical sits somewhere between the false infinity of the 
categorematic and the “true” and absolute infinite that is without parts. Now, since 
Leibniz rejects both the categorematical infinite as contradictory and the infinity of 
repetition as impossible (or indeed contradictory), the syncategorematical infinite must 
however also be distinguished from the absolute, that is, hypercategorematic infinite. 
From this  we see  that  this  three-fold  distinction  is  important  precisely  because  it 
allows us to prevent the development of the syncategorematical infinite from falling 
into two types of error. The first error is to explain the syncategorematic infinite by 
means of a “fictionalization” of the categorematic infinite, to make the mediated and 
non-absolute identical to the immediate and the absolute, that is, to model Leibniz’s 
infinite on the fictionalization of a contradiction. This is no way to read Leibniz’s 
understanding  of  “fiction.”  The  second  error  is  to  explain  the  syncategorematic 
infinite by means of a reduction to a  “potential” infinite by means of division or 
repetition. Since what the syncategorematical infinite aims to express – distinguishing 
itself  from  the  contradictory  categorematical  infinite  and  the  absolute 
hypercategorematical  infinite  –  is  an  actuality  that,  despite  being  derived  from  an 
origin  in  the  absolute,  it  cannot  simply  be  reduced  to  other  terms.16  Without  
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investigating all the details of the syncategorematical infinite here, we are nonetheless 
in a position to understand the specific determination that Leibniz gave to the notion 
of the infinite and infinitesimal.  
To  be  clear,  what I  am  not  arguing  here  is  that  there  is  an  equivocation 
regarding these terms. Rather what is equivocal concerns how we interpret their role 
in  foundational  matters  in  Leibniz’s  mathematics  especially  with  regard  to  the 
“fictional” nature of infinitesimals. In order to grasp these problems in a clearer way, 
my intention here is to provide a non-equivocal basis from which to move into greater 
complexity.    
 
Mathematical Ontology and the Reducibility of Infinitesimals 
 In  recent  Anglophone  reception  of  Leibniz’s  mathematics,  it  was  Hide 
Ishiguro’s  work  that  has  provided  the  critical  push  toward  a  focus  on  the 
syncategorematic status of Leibniz’s infinitesimals. However, it is also with Ishiguro 
that we find a strong drive towards a reductive reading of their syncategorematical 
status as a general reduction of the infinitesimal to mathematical objects as such.17 
What this reading assumes, as I will argue below, is a reduction of the admissibility of 
infinitesimal terms in mathematics to what in modern terms we might designate as a 
meta-mathematical or ontological claim about the status of these infinitesimal terms.18 
Although not erroneous, Ishiguro’s approach, with the exception of a clear rejection 
of actual infinitesimals in Leibniz, leads to a number of empty claims about Leibniz’s 
infinitesimals and lends very little to understanding the meaning of the “fictional,” 
status of these syncategorematical infinitesimals. 
Ishiguro’s reading of the status of infinite and infinitesimals in the second 
edition of Leibniz’s Philosophy of Logic and Language provides a rather important example 
of how Leibniz’s fictions are interpreted through a reductive position. The goal of 
Ishiguro  in  this  part  of  her  book  is  to  vindicate  Leibniz  from  charges  of 
unrigorousness  by  demonstrating  the  consistency  of  Leibniz’s  notion  of  the 
infinitesimals.  Ishiguro’s  text  is  historically  important  in  her  emphasis  on  the 
syncategorematic nature of Leibniz’s infinitesimals. Her understanding of these terms 
as  well  as  her  general  conclusion  is  highly  problematic  however  insofar  as  her 
reductive  position  erases  much  of  what  is  important  about  Leibniz’s  fictional 
treatment of these terms.  
In Ishiguro’s treatment of Leibniz’s infinitesimals, she begins her discussion 
by referring to Abraham Robinson’s 1966 Non-Standard Analysis.19 Robinson’s project 
for a notion of a non-finite, non-standard, that is, non-Archimedean concept of an 
infinitesimal quantity, represents perhaps the most far-reaching attempt to combine 
the elements of the Newton-Leibniz calculus, the transfinite revolution of Cantor and 
the formalist methods of the model theoretic theory of sets: the development of a 
strong  concept  of  the  infinitesimal  as,  formally  speaking,  a  number  less  than  the 
absolute value of any standard real number (n<|R| where n is a number and R is a 
standard real number), a project that has, in turn, revived new reflections on Leibniz’s 
legacy.20 Demonstrating the awareness of his participation in a historical lineage that 
owes much to Leibniz, Robinson ’s own mathematical treatise devotes a number of  
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pages to a reading of Leibniz on numbers and infinitesimals and an interpretation of 
his own contributions along these lines.  
Ishiguro’s manner of discussing Robinson and the contrast she draws with 
Leibniz is a clear illustration of the assumptions that drive her reductionist aims in 
Leibniz interpretation. Robinson posits the infinitesimal as a non-Archimedean (non-
standard) entity, and the meta-mathematical context of this notion of the infinitesimal 
qua entity is given through an axiomatic formalism. By contrasting Leibniz to this 
approach, Ishiguro aims to show that Leibniz’s rejection of anything resembling an 
infinitesimal  “entity”  leads  to  a  reductive  metaphysical  position  for  infinitesimals. 
What  is  curious  in  this  intersection  between  the  development  of  mathematical 
concepts  driven  by  Robinson’s  work  and  Ishiguro’s  reinvestigation  of  Leibniz’s 
philosophical-mathematical legacy is that there is an ironic misunderstanding at work. 
Robinson’s  contribution,  according  to  his  own  view,  is  the  development  of  the 
concept of infinitesimals in the Leibnizian fashion that had been superseded in the 
early  nineteenth  century  by  Cauchy’s  re-foundation  of  the  interpretation  of 
infinitesimals in the differential calculus by means of limits rather than as entities.21 
Whereas the (mistaken) implication of the infinitesimal as an entity had always cast a 
shadow on the entire method, the notion of the limit has historically proved to 
provoke less skepticism.22 In turn Robinson, employing a set of mathematical methods 
made standard by the Cantorian revolution and axiomatic formalism, returns to the 
original project of Leibniz as interpreted by L’Hôpital and provides a rigorous method 
of laying out the infinitesimal as entity (and not merely as limit) in his “non-standard” 
approach to arithmetic, topology and analysis. In fact, the recognition of a distinction 
between  a  path  of  the  limit  and  that  of  the  entity  in  the  development  of  the 
infinitesimal concept is at the center of Robinson’s emphasis of the originality of his 
own contribution.  
Robinson is quick to note the stark difference between the modern debates 
around the metaphysics of mathematics and that of earlier periods. Insofar as Cantor 
and  the  mathematicians  of  the  Grundlagenkrise  der  Mathematik  had  focused  on  the 
globally  logical  character  of  the  issue  of  mathematical  objectivity,  the  reality  and 
objectivity of mathematical entities and their surrounding methodology are treated as 
a whole and not separated between “normal” mathematical entities like the natural 
numbers (1, 2, 3…) and numbers with special status like Π, i, irrational numbers and 
even infinites and infinitesimals. Robinson remarks that,  
 
[W]hatever our outlook and in spite of Leibniz’ position, it appears to 
us today that the infinitely small and infinitely large numbers of a 
non-standard model of Analysis are neither more nor less real than, 
for example, standard irrational numbers. […] For all measurements 
are recorded in terms of integers or rational numbers, and if our 
theoretical  framework  goes  beyond  these  there  is  no  compelling 
reason why we should stay within an Archimedean number system.23  
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After making this claim, Robinson deftly turns to Leibniz’s 1701 letter to 
Pinson, cited above, “On ne differe du style d’Archimède que dans les expressions 
[…],”  implying  that  even  if  the  non-standard  infinitesimals  go  beyond  standard 
expressions, they are in not in conflict with them precisely in the sense that they do 
not cover the same field of application.24 What he then makes clear regarding his 
relation to Leibniz is that the debate of the status of “his” infinitesimals should, on the 
one hand, be held in common with the debate on the status of real numbers and 
indeed number as such.  
  Robinson’s remarks here demonstrate his clarity on two important points. 
First, Robinson understands that Leibniz’s own determination of the mathematical 
infinite and infinitesimal was a syncategorematical one and therefore Archimedean in 
nature. Secondly, he understood that his own notion of the infinitesimals are to be 
interpreted  systematically  and  holistically  within  modern  meta-mathematical  and 
mathematical standards and hence at a certain distance from 17th century context of 
rigor and admissibility. As he continues, he touches on Lagrange, d’Alembert and 
finally Cauchy’s deepening of the calculus project by means of limits. In this, though 
Cantor himself rejected the possibility of infinitesimals qua number, the Cantorian 
revolution  of  method  for  tackling  these  problems  provided  the  grounds  for 
Robinson’s own infinitesimal quantities. Robinson uses the reference to Leibniz in 
order to establish a historical understanding of some of the continuities, but also, 
more importantly, to mark the discontinuities that exist between his project and its 
Leibnizian inheritance.  
Ishiguro distances her reading of Leibniz from Robinson by making a clear 
distinction of camp. In her view, Robinson, by the standards of modern mathematics 
and  that  of  Fregean  and  Russellian  contextual  reference  to  mathematical  objects, 
successfully argues for non-Archimedean infinitesimals. Yet even if  we accept the 
results of his work, “his belief that, even if Leibniz considered infinitesimals to be an 
ideal fiction which can be dispensed with, these infinitesimals for Leibniz were fixed 
entities  with  non-Archimedean  magnitudes,  the  introduction  of  which  shortens 
proofs,  seems  unwarranted.”25  We  should  note  that  this  is  a  gross  misreading  of 
Robinson, for whom Leibniz served only as a forebear of his method, as the latest 
development of the historical path of the infinitesimal that privileged an entity-like 
conception. Nonetheless, what Ishiguro hopes to argue is that a proper reading of the 
notion  of  the  infinitesimal  puts  us  in  a  theoretical  continuity  with  an  alternative 
historical path that privileged a limit-like conception. The main reasoning for this is 
that a proper understanding of Leibniz’s syncategorematic infinitesimals will place it in 
continuity with traditional or standard Archimedean sums that follow the principle of 
the whole being greater than a part.  
Ishiguro’s argument then begins with an incorrect construal of Robinson’s view 
of  Leibniz  where  infinitesimals  are  fixed,  categorematic  entities.  She  then  argues 
against this by demonstrating their syncategorematic status in Leibniz’s work. From 
here,  she  proceeds  to  show  that  this  implies  that  Leibniz’s  treatment  of 
syncategorematic  infinitesimals  is  effectively  what  gives  the  entity  character  of 
infinitesimal magnitudes a fictional status. This fiction does not allow for any true  
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entity but rather, through Leibniz’s use of mathematical symbolism, only captures the 
relationship  between  two  finite  but  variable  points  that  ultimately  obey  the 
Archimedean principle of the whole-part relation. 
Despite these stated misgivings in her reading of Robinson, Ishiguro does 
provide  one  very  pertinent  assessment  of  how  one  is  to  understand  the 
syncategorematic character of infinitesimals in Leibniz. First, the distinction that she 
employs, the distinction between entity and limit, is based on the identification of real 
or actual infinitesimals as a special, non-Archimedean type of number, the very type of 
number  that  Robinson  himself  aims  to  develop  in  Non-Standard  Analysis.  Her 
argument  relies  on  the  fact  that  there  is  no  such  special  status  given  to  the 
infinitesimal in Leibniz’s own work. But in Leibniz’s own words, as Ishiguro is keen to 
point out, “This is why I believed that in order to avoid subtleties and to make my 
reasoning clear to everyone, it would suffice here to explain the infinite through the 
incomparable,  that  is,  to  think  of  quantities  incomparably  greater  or  smaller  than 
ours.”26  
Here,  it  is  only  apparent  that  Leibniz  leaned  toward  just  the  kind  of 
incomparability  that  would  give  infinitesimals  this  “incomparable,”  that  is,  non-
standard character. It is precisely this sort of claim that would have given rise to 
ambiguous interpretations of infinitesimals even in Leibniz’s own day. As Ishiguro 
points out, however, there is no great mystery about how one is to understand these 
magnitudes or quantities termed “incomparable,” since the relation between the side 
of a plane to its area (a one dimensional comparison with a two dimensional) is the 
standard sort of relationship referenced by the incomparable. The term incomparable 
distinguishes two quantities and two dimensions but does not give to any of these, 
taken in themselves, a non-Archimedean status. The incomparable is thus a neutral 
term in this debate about the status of the infinite and infinitesimal.27 As Ishiguro 
continues to argue, the supposedly infinitesimal magnitude in question, the differential 
dy/dx is not infinitesimal but rather a finite relation between differentials (unless dy 
and dx are infinitesimals of different orders).28 Here, the incomparability in question 
concerns the relationship between the magnitudes themselves and not, as it might 
seem, the relation between finite and infinitesimal magnitudes. Though she does not 
give an example, this neutral notion of the relation of incomparability can be said of 
the relation between the side of a polygon and its area.29  
From this clarification of the equivocation of the use of (in)comparability, 
Ishiguro’s  argument  turns  to  introduce  the  syncategorematic  character  of  the 
infinitesimal to “save” Leibniz from misreadings that identify “incomparable” with the 
“non-standard.” She quotes Leibniz’s argument to Varignon where he argued for the 
non-rigorous  identification  of  rest  as  a  kind  of  motion  and  a  circle  as  a  kind  of 
polygon by virtue of the fact that,  
 
[R]est, equality and the circle terminate the motions, inequalities and 
the regular polygons which arrive at them by a continuous change 
and  vanish  in  them.  And  although  these  terminating  points 
[terminaisons] are excluded, that is, are not included in any rigorous  
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sense in the variables which they limit, they nevertheless have the 
same properties as if they were included in the series, in accordance 
with the language of infinites and infinitesimals, which take the circle, 
for example as a regular polygon with an infinite number of sides.30  
 
From this, Ishiguro argues that here we find Leibniz describing the infinite in 
many of the same ways that contemporary students of calculus would, that is, with the 
terminating points treated as limits that are approached by a function (like a regular 
polygon approaching circularity by virtue of increasing its number of sides) without 
rigorously taking the last point into the function itself. She adds to this, however, a 
caution: 
 
I  think Leibniz  is  misleading  when  he  writes  to  Varignon  that 
truthfully speaking he himself is not sure whether he shouldn’t treat 
infinitesimals as ideal things or as well-founded fictions. The limit 
may be a well-founded fiction, but talk of infinitesimals is, as he says, 
syncategorematic and is actually about ‘quantities that one takes […] 
as small as is necessary in order that the error should be smaller than 
the given error.’31  
 
According to the idea of the infinitesimal’s syncategorematic status, Ishiguro’s 
interpretation of Leibniz naturally leads to favor the reading of Leibniz’s infinitesimals 
as a proto-limit, that is, a proto-Cauchyian idea. In this, she strongly identifies the 
syncategorematic  understanding  of  the  infinite  and  infinitesimals  with  the  limit 
concept.  Here  Ishiguro  argues  that  the  combination  of  the  infinitesimal  with  the 
notion of the limit allows us, as it does in common usage today, to speak of the 
variables on a function approaching zero as a limit. As such, Ishiguro remarks: 
 
[W]e  have  seen  that  Leibniz  denied  that  infinitesimals  were  fixed 
magnitudes,  and  claimed  that  we  were  asserting  the  existence  of 
variable finite magnitudes… we could say that Cauchy claimed that 
limits existed whereas Leibniz wanted to say that they were a well-
founded fiction.32  
 
According to this view, the difference between Leibniz and  Cauchy would then be 
“very little.”33  
This interpretation of Leibniz’s infinitesimal as a proto-limit is accurate in 
many respects. In retrospect since Leibniz did not commit to an actual infinite or 
infinitesimal  entity  but  proposed  a  syncategorematic  one,  Ishiguro’s  proto-limit 
interpretation of Leibniz is compelling. However, she is only half right. That is, the 
larger aspect of her argument seems to skew the many different attempts to both put 
the idea into question in Leibniz’s own reflections and the different ways in which the 
attempts to defend his conception provide opportunities for him to reinvent or make 
nuances in his use and significance of the term. An obvious mark of this is how  
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Ishiguro’s  argument  turns  on  the  false  dichotomy  between  a  Robinsonian,  non-
Archimedean  or  non-standard  “entity”  nature  of  the  infinitesimal,  and  a  proto-
Cauchyian limit or finite variable nature of the infinitesimal. Indeed Leibniz did not 
view this alternation between a fictional entity and a limit as a problem for developing 
a new class or type wherein these quantities exist. Leibniz simply did not involve 
himself with ontological questions of this sort.34 In turn, Leibniz’s problem seems to 
have been how one is to understand the status of infinitesimals given the necessary 
constraints  that  they  are  not  in  any  manner  fixed  quantities,  unities,  wholes  or 
numbers. 
Ishiguro  argues  that  in  order  to  understand  the status  of  infinitesimals  in 
Leibniz,  we  should  not  hesitate  to  import  Frege’s  idea  of  contextual  theory  of 
meaning and Russell’s idea of definite descriptions, two fundamental principles of the 
contemporary philosophical approach to mathematical objectivity. For Ishiguro, the 
Fregean  idea  of  salva  veritate  applies  entirely  to  Leibniz’s  use  of  infinitesimals  in 
calculation, and thus there should be nothing, in terms of the conservation of truth 
values, to mark Leibniz’s use of the infinitesimal as inconsistent with contemporary 
evaluations of mathematical propositions. In this, she also notes that Frege explicitly 
remarks on the differential, “It is enough if the proposition taken as a whole has a 
sense; it is this that confers on its parts and also their content. This observation is 
destined, I believe, to throw light on quite a number of difficult concepts, among 
them that of the infinitesimal.”35 On the other, Russellian side, she remarks that as a 
special example in his section on definite descriptions in the  Principia Mathematica, 
“Russell […] gave the sign for the differential d/dx as his first example of a sign with 
which we are familiar which has a meaning only contextually.”36 Noting that Russell’s 
theory  of  definite  descriptions  is  aimed  at  unique  existentials,  she  invokes  the 
syncategorematic  status  of  infinitesimals  as  that  which  determines  a  limit.  This 
determination,  through  the  use  of  a  symbolic  notation  dy/dx,  puts  the  Leibnizian 
determination  of  the  infinitesimal  in  consistency  with  the  modern,  that  is,  post-
Russellian view of the logical status of mathematical objects. In the end she argues, 
despite the differences between Frege and Russell, Leibniz’s views on infinitesimals 
can be consistent with both theories.37  
  This reductionist reading, although apparently metaphysically neutral, relies 
on a rather heavy metaphysical assumptions about logical consist ency, successful 
reference  and  objectivity.  More  importantly,  in  construing  the  problem  of 
infinitesimals in this manner, however, we remove the need to ask what makes 
infinitesimals “fictional” with respect to other references from number. That is, in the 
attempt to vindicate Leibniz’s infinitesimal from a Russellian misunderstanding, we 
end up losing what is specifically Leibnizian in the approach to this problem. 
This confusion allows us to see the ultimate irony in Ishiguro’s position. The 
fact is that Robinson, as Ishiguro also claims, had already laid the foundation for a 
rigorous,  albeit  non-standard  use  of  infinitesimals  qua  entity.  Thus  Robinson’s 
infinitesimals,  according  to  the  standards  of  modern,  post-Cantorian  means  of 
argumentation,  fulfill  both  the  Fregean  and  Russellian  conditions  of  mathematical 
legitimacy  raised  in  her  evaluation  of  Leibnizian  infinitesimals.  Ironically,  her  
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evaluation seems to be lacking in the very places where Leibniz’s views would require 
the  most  explanation,  in  the  deployment  of  infinite  and  infinitesimal  terms  as 
specifically  Archimedean.  In  this  sense,  her  justification  of  Leibniz’s  infinitesimal 
suffers  from  both  a  historical  treatment  as  well  as  an  attention  to  the  specific 
ontological question lurking behind it. The problem I refer to here lies in that the 
question that Ishiguro attempts to resolve is neither Leibniz’s nor Robinson’s. Indeed, 
Leibniz’s difficulty with the status of infinitesimals lies not in his already formed idea 
of a fundamental criterion of the exclusion of non-Archimedean wholes, but rather in 
its  conceptual  coordination  with  Archimedean  terms.  In  this  sense,  even  if  we 
appreciate her focus on the syncategorematic status of Leibniz’s infinitesimals, her 
reductive reading is one that does not clarify the meaning of these syncategorematic 
infinitesimals that she has so carefully emphasized. In turn, she associates their well-
foundedness with contextual reference, a move that anachronistically removes us from 
a  position  of  being  able  to  treat  their  meaning  and  status  qua  fictional  and 
syncategorematic in distinction from other more standard sorts of numbers.38  
A final important remark concerning this form of equivocation has to do with 
the role that Leibniz has played in the recent history of mathem atics and the 
philosophy of mathematics. The nature of Leibniz ’s reception today, especially its 
Anglophone context inaugurated by B. Russell himself, has a lot to do with the 20th 
century confrontation of the Grundlagenkrise that found deep inspiration in Leibniz’s 
grappling  with  the  continuum,  logical  predication,  binary  mathematics  (through 
computing) and the vision of a mathesis universalis. Of course, there is no denying that 
visionary thinkers like Cantor, Frege, Russell, Gödel and others drew inspiration from 
Leibniz. What becomes problematic is how Leibniz’s interpretation becomes indexed, 
retroactively, to the standards of this Grundlagenkrise.  
The  result  is  that  questions  asked  of  Leibniz  become  immediately  those 
questions  asked  by  those  thinkers  of  the  Grundlagenkrise;  taking  for  granted  the 
convergence of the question of the ontological status of mathematical objects and the 
methodology through which mathematics is grounded. This is most obvious in the 
work of Frege and Russell where the method through which mathematics is grounded 
is simply a theory of mathematical ontology, an identification that will eventually be 
philosophically critiqued in Benaceraff’s famous 1965 article, “What numbers could not 
be.”39  
The closing of the Grundlagenkrise, due in part to Gödel’s and Cohen’s results, 
does  not  mean  the  end  of  foundational  questions  in  mathematics,  but  only  its 
relativization. That is, a number of different accounts of mathematical foundations 
can be treated simultaneously without the requirement of homogeneity. This in fact 
demonstrates that the temporary unification of questions about foundational ontology 
and the foundations of the methods in mathematics was one that was historically 
stitched together in an epoch where logicism provided the main challenge. In the later 
20th century, the new wave of category theory, as the main pretender to the throne of 
foundation, has been capable of specifying in what way category theory may or may 
not be a foundational account of mathematics. Jean-Pierre Marquis, an avid supporter 
of the importance of category theory, has laid out not less than six different senses  
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(logical,  cognitive,  epistemological,  semantical,  ontological,  methodological 
/pragmatic) of a “foundation” for mathematics.40 What Marquis emphasizes is that a 
foundational account for mathematics is now relativized along the lines of a pragmatic 
(or methodological) set of  “toolbox” notions more sensitive to the methodology of 
the “working mathematician” than to the question of an ultimate logical status. With 
this, it is not so much that we stop asking ontological questions about mathematical 
terms, objects and operations. It is rather that these questions no longer seek a neat 
and common solution. 
 
The Admissibility of Infinitesimals and the Rigor of Demonstrations 
 My critique of Ishiguro’s anachronistic approach that leads to equivocation 
seems to immediately recommend a “toolbox” approach, borrowing Marquis’ terms, 
for  dealing  with  Leibniz’s  fictional  infinitesimals;  we  shall  see  below  how  this 
approach  can  also  lead  to  equivocal  results  as  well.  Here,  I  argue  again  that  a 
reductionist  approach  to  infinitesimals  clouds  our  capacity  to  understand  the 
foundational constraints through which Leibniz developed his mathematical methods. 
What is equivocal in this case concerns the “order of reasons” in understanding the 
rigor  of  Leibniz’s  infinitesimal  methods.  As  I  shall  argue,  the  problems  of  the 
admissibility are staked on a deeper and more historically entrenched problem of the 
form of proof. It is in addressing this “thorny” problem of the form of proof that 
Leibniz introduces his infinitesimal fictions. What we should understand is that the 
reducibility of Leibniz’s infinitesimal methods into finite terms is not the fulcrum 
upon which the rigor of his method is balanced. Rather, the priority of the problem of 
proof renders the admissibility of infinitesimal methods as a secondary problem. Here 
the equivocation that I aim to critique lies in the direct association of rigor in Leibniz’s 
methods with the reducibility of infinitesimal terms. This equivocation both occludes 
the problem of rigor in mathematics as Leibniz understood it and overshadows the 
complexity of infinitesimals in Leibniz’s thought.  
  My choice for a concrete look at Leibniz’s methodology is the De quadratura 
arithemetica circuli ellipseos et hyperbolae cujus corollarium est trigonometria sine tabulis (1675). 
This rich and complex text represents one of the jewels that have been delivered by 
the  efforts  to  carefully  organize  Leibniz’s  mathematical  corpus  in  the  Akademie 
edition. First edited by E. Knobloch, to whom we owe this new-found accessibility, 
the text represents one of Leibniz’s rare and longest purely mathematical treatises 
written in such a format. It is a highly polished text, conceived by Leibniz as a means 
of entering the Royal Academy of Sciences, in Paris; it is now available in a bilingual 
edition (Latin text by Knobloch and French translation by Parmentier). A good reason 
for looking at this text is also its distance from the later justificatory treatments of 
infinitesimals where the questions to which Leibniz was made to respond to were not 
exactly his own, but framed around debates in the French context. By presenting the 
constraints  that  Leibniz  set  down  for  himself  in  the  initial  development  of  the 
methods  of  the  differential  calculus,  these  texts  shine  a  new  light  on  Leibniz’s 
thinking.   
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The  Quadratura  is  too  rich  and  complex  of  a  text  to  examine  here  in  a 
comprehensive way. Yet I wish to highlight a number of its features salient to our 
discussion, and this cannot be done without taking a quick look at a fragment of the 
foundational portions of its argumentation. In this text, Leibniz’s ambition was to 
treat not only the “geometric” curves of apollonian conic shapes (the circle, ellipse, 
hyperbola, etc.), but rather to open up a possibility for understanding the complex 
“mechanical,” that is, logarithmic, curves. The ambition of this text on Leibniz’s part 
is plain to see, but we shall confine ourselves to the rudimentary development, in the 
first 7 propositions, of the basic method.41   
The  first  five  propositions  are  preparation  for  the  demonstration  of  a 
quadrature of the half circle starting with the sixth proposition and determination of 
the area of a triangle in prop ortion to a triangle determined by the height of said 
triangle in line with Euclidian geometry and in defining a series number of arithmetic 
relations. The goal, starting at the sixth proposition, which Leibniz notes as  “most 
thorny” or “spinosissima,”42 is to provide an argument for the quadrature of a quarter-
circle through the equation of the area under the half circle with the added sum of a 
series of rectilineal figures, in this case, a series of obtuse triangles. At the start of the 
sixth proposition Leibniz  begins  with  a  quarter-circle C  between  two  axes,  A  the 
horizontal axis and B the vertical axis. He then chooses a number of points on C, 1C, 
2C, 3C, 4C, etc. This series of points on C are thus defined as a point between a series 
of abscissa and ordinates, 1A1B for point 1C and so on. Taking the tangents of these 
points on C, he finds the intersection between the tangents and the horizontal axis A 
to define a series of points 1T, 2T, 3T, 4T, etc. From this, Leibniz produces a second 
series of points 1D, 2D, 3D, 4D, etc. by defining 1D as 1T1B, 2D as 2T2B, etc. The 
series of new points gives us a new curve D, defined by the tangent lines on the 
original half circle curve C and the ordinates of points on C. In defining this new 
curve D, Leibniz will bracket the quadrature of the original curve C for the moment in 
order to provide a quadrature of this auxiliary curve.   
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Fig. 143 
 
After defining the auxiliary curve D through the points 1D, 2D, 3D, etc. 
Leibniz defines a series of points by taking the chords between the original curve C: 
between 1C and 2C, between 2C and 3C, between 3C and 4C, etc. The chords will 
intersect the horizontal axis A and give a new set of points 1M, 2M, 3M, 4M and the 
like.  Taking  once  again  the  series  of points M  (as  abscissa)  and  the  points B  (as 
ordinates), Leibniz creates what he calls a “spatium rectilineum gradiforme” (shaded area in 
the figure below) or what we might call a “step function.” In short, this designates a 
rectilineal figure G whose area is comparable to the area under the curve D.   
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Fig 244 
 
In  brief,  Leibniz’s  argument  concerning  the  auxiliary  curve  D  and  the 
rectilinear figure G consists in showing that by placing the points C more closely 
together, we can reduce the difference between the areas under the auxiliary curve D 
and figure G. Here we can simply notice that at any given interval, there is a difference 
between the figure G and the curve D but we also see that the more points on C, 
points closer together, that we start with, the more this difference diminishes as the 
rectilinear figure becomes more finely graduated. Conforming with the intuition of a 
circle as an infinitely sided polygon, the intuition in this case is that such a gradiform 
rectilinear space can become indiscernibly identical with the curve in question.  
From this Leibniz moves on to generalize the results about this rectilinear 
gradiform space G and the auxiliary curve D for the original curve C by using the set 
of arcs between 1C and 2C, 2C and 3C, etc. that were already involved in his previous 
reasoning about the auxiliary curve. Hence, starting with the origin A, we have a series 
of obtuse triangles A1C2C, A2C3C, etc. that are inscribed in the half circle C (see 
figure 2). Leibniz’s argument here aims to identify the area of this series of triangles 
with the half circle C. The argument that he gives proceeds by reduction ad absurdum. 
Leibniz was careful to note in the first proposition of the Quadratura that the relation 
between a triangle and a rectangle of the same height and length is that of 1 to 2. 
Here,  we  see  that  these  inscribed  triangles  correspond  to  the  rectangles  in  the 
gradiform space in terms of height and length since both are determined by abscissa  
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determined by the chords drawn on C and the ordinates of 1C2C3C, etc. points on C. 
As such, the area of the combined triangles T should be exactly half that of the 
combined rectangles Q.  
From this constructive basis, Leibniz then moves to a demonstration for an 
accomplished  quadrature.  This  takes  place  in  the  form  of  a  reductio  proof.  For 
purposes of reductio, we pose that there is a difference between these two figures and 
that there is a difference Z between Q and twice T.  
Q-2T=Z.  
Following the same reasoning, we can imagine a polygon P inscribed inside 
figure T which would allow us to say that the difference between P and T would be 
less than the difference between the quarter of Z.  
T-P<Z/4.  
In the same way, we imagine a new gradiform space G in Q. In the same way, 
we obtain that the difference between Q and G and the quarter of Z.   
Q-G<Z/4 
We  then  apply  these  two  inequalities  to  the  original  formula  asserted  for 
purpose of reductio. We obtain: 
Q-2P<Z/4 
2P-2T<2Z/4 
By the principle of triangular inequality treated by Leibniz in proposition 4, 
we obtain: 
Z = Q – 2 T < |Q – 2P| + |2P – 2T| = 3Z/4 
Quod est absurdum. As Leibniz argues, “It is thus impossible to suppose any 
difference since Z was undetermined and could have represented any [quantity]. Twice 
the trilineal [figure] is thus equal to the quadrilineal [figure].”45 This argument results 
in contradiction and we arrive at the conclusion that there is no difference between Q 
and 2T.   
  There are two aspects of Leibniz’s argument here that we should linger over. 
As  other  commentators  have  underlined,  what  we  can  gather  from  Leibniz’s 
methodology  here  is  that  it  is  clearly  classical  in  its  presentation  and  manner  of 
proceeding. In Knobloch’s evaluation, he insists that this classical mode does render 
novel  methods  which  puts  this  text  squarely  in  the  modern,  that  is,  post-Greek, 
context.46 This modernity is represented by the second, more delicate, aspect of the 
proof, Leibniz’s inventive use of the reductio argument.  
  For the first aspect, it is clear that Leibniz sought to base his demonstrations 
on a solid foundation of construction. This methodological ethos on Leibniz’s part 
required, as we saw, a longer demonstration that required the creation of an auxiliary 
curve and a grounding in triangular relations à la Euclid. Here, as many commentators 
will mention, Leibniz plays on an intuition of “passing to the limit” and comes very 
close to the ε-δ definition of limits that we are familiar to today due to the work of 
mathematicians from Cauchy to Bolzano.47 Despite this, Leibniz proceeds in the sort 
of rigor that connected his argument with an Euclidian and Archimedan methodology 
which may have even appeared conservative according to the spirit of the times.   
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  The  second  aspect,  setting  Leibniz  apart  as  truly  modern,  concerns  the 
indirect or reductio argument utilized to deliver a final synthesis on the initial layer of 
constructions  in  his  Quadratura.  This  does  indeed  deliver  something  of  a  modern 
flavor. Yet what is modern is not exactly Leibniz’s use of the reductio form that was 
commonplace  in  classical  attempts  at  quadrature  through  exhaustion  (Euclid  and 
Archimedes). What is modern in Leibniz’s argument here is how he uses this reductio 
form in the course of his demonstration and in relation to his constructions. As it 
turns  out,  this  is  also  where  Leibniz  makes  explicit  mention  of  the  “fiction”  of 
infinitesimals. Leibniz himself explains in the scholium to proposition 7, 
I  admit  of  never  having  heard  of  a  method  capable  of  perfectly 
demonstrating the quadrature that is not an ad absurdum quadrature; I 
even have reasons to worry that we might not do so in a natural 
manner  without  introducing  fictive  quantities,  I  mean  infinites  or 
infinitely  small;  however  among  all  the  deductions  ad  absurdum,  I 
think that the most simple, the most natural manner of proceeding 
and the closest manner to a direct demonstration consists in directly 
showing (without which we are ordinarily led to a double reasoning 
in proving that one is not, on the one hand greater and on the other 
hand less that the other) that there is no difference between two 
quantities and these quantities are equal.48 
 
As we see here, what is truly innovative about Leibniz’s approach, as he was 
certainly aware, is that he provides a “more simple” and “more natural” approach that 
is at a certain distance from the traditional mode of a double reductio that is needed in 
the strictly Archimedean approach. The significance of this Leibnizian innovation is 
precisely grasped in S. Levey’s evaluation of the argument,  
 
No direct construction of the area of the quadrilineal by means of a 
single step space would be possible without representing the step 
space  as  composed  of  infinitely  many  infinitely  small  (narrow) 
rectangles. But with the new principle of equality in play, it suffices to 
show that any given claim of finite inequality between the two areas 
can be proved false by some particular finite construction, even if 
there is no single finite construction that at once gives the quadrature 
of the curve exactly. No ‘ultimate construction’ lying at the limit is 
required. Under the aegis of the principle of equality, the system of 
relations among the series of finite constructions already proves the 
equality; Leibniz’s novel technique of elementary and complementary 
rectangles  thus  obviates  the  need  to  appeal  to  infinitely  small 
quantities altogether.49 
 
In looking at the Quadratura, we can easily agree with Levey’s emphasis on the 
lack of any appeal to anything other than finite terms. Of course, as Levey also notes,  
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this result is made possible by a “new” principle of equality and hence the argument in 
Quadratura is not merely a repetition of Archimedian exhaustion but constitutes an 
ingenious advancement. In this advancement, Levey continues to argue,  
 
It  goes  without  saying  that  his  technical  accomplishments  in 
quadratures  far  outstrip  the  original  reaches  of  the  method  of 
exhaustion… [A]t the level of the basic logic of the proof strategy, 
Leibniz’s  reasoning  in  Prop.  6  very  much  bears  the  stamp  of 
Archimedes; perhaps we should call it a neo-Archimedean style of 
proof.50 
 
Leibniz’s neo-classicism is clear not only in the mathematical domain but also 
in his thought in general. His appeal to Archimedes in mathematics is powerfully 
mirrored by his appeal to Aristotle in metaphysics. Yet, just as Leibniz’s metaphysics is 
not simply reduced to Aristotle, his mathematics represents a significant leap from its 
Archimedean roots. With one foot in the past and one foot in the future, Leibniz’s 
often remarked eclecticism is an emanation of this theoretical attitude that is at once 
conservative and progressive.51  
  In examining Leibniz’s method in the Quadratura, we can see how Leibniz’s 
infinitesimal fictions are to be considered as reducible to finite terms. This directly 
corresponds to the syncategorematical infinite that Leibniz can be shown to have 
unequivocally held at least since the mid-1670’s and anticipates the ε-δ definition of 
limit that will eventually be established through Cauchy and Weierstrass. The first 
aspect of Leibniz’s argumentation highlighted above shows his intent to remain in the 
classical  constructive  tradition.  The  second,  innovative  and  modern,  aspect  of 
Leibniz’s argumentation lead us to understand that the progressive dimension of his 
work, seen in his use of the reductio argument, is made in view of this first aspect. In 
both  of  these  aspects,  we  understand  how  Leibniz’s  use  of  infinitesimal  fictions 
amounts,  in  practice,  to  reasoning  with  finite  terms  in  a  way  that  represented  an 
innovative leap from classical mathematical practice. In this sense, we can strictly 
maintain that the interpretation of Leibniz’s infinitesimal fiction as methodologically 
reducible, qua abrégé, to purely or merely finite expressions is legitimate.  
Although  legitimate,  this  approach  encounters  some  immediate  limits 
however  and  we  can  begin  to  see  this  by  considering  the  weight  that  this 
methodological  reducibility  carries  in  the  rigor  of  the  demonstration.  Leibniz’s 
concern with rigor in his argument does not lie with the status of infinitesimals. We 
can see this directly in the worry that Leibniz expresses in the scholia to proposition 7 
quoted above. It was the use of indirect demonstration that bothered Leibniz, but he 
ultimately affirms that it is through the use of these fictional entities that his argument 
through inequalities can be understood as “more simple” and “more natural” than 
earlier approaches. With respect to the standards of rigor, Leibniz is not so much 
concerned with these fictive entities but rather the form of proof. His manner of 
proceeding  is  a  departure  from  standard  means  of  employing  indirect  or  reductio 
demonstration  but  he  remains  confident  that  his  version  of  a  reductio  argument,  
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through his new principle of equality, is as close as one might get to a direct argument 
concerning the quadrature. As Mancosu argues in his recent Philosophy of Mathematics 
and Mathematical Practice in the Seventeenth Century, however, much of the questions of 
rigor in post-classical mathematics leading up to Leibniz time concerned the debate 
over the preference for direct or a priori proofs over indirect or reductio proofs; a 
debate over rigor that profoundly impacted Cavalieri and Descartes was also one that 
did not escape Leibniz. 
  Clarifying  the  sort  of  questions  that  were  asked  by  Leibniz’s  near 
contemporaries about rigor can help us resituate the context of Leibniz’s argument 
here.  As Mancosu  has  carefully  pointed  out,  the  movement  of  mathematics from 
Ancient  Greece  through  the  Renaissance  toward  the  modern  period  should  not 
exactly be traced along the path of the concept of infinity. Here we can add that it is 
only through the opening up of Cantor’s paradise that it might suit us to understand 
the modern period as eventually leading to transfinitude and axiomatic set theory. 
Mancosu points to a number of important Greek figures like Archimedes and Theon 
who  already  made  generous  use  of  exhaustion  and  indivisibles  in  quadrature 
problems.52 The 17th century was no doubt a period where these authors and their 
methods sparked a renewed interest such that we might call this period one of 
“rediscovery.” The key difference is that, as Mancosu writes, “For the Greeks there 
was no doubt that infinitary techniques, like the ones employed in the indivisibilist 
method,  could  not  be  formally  accepted  and  had  only  heuristic  value.”53  In  the 
movement to modernity, through the late Renaissance, mathematical rigor came under 
the scrutiny of Aristotelian method. Concerning the possibility of geometry’s inclusion 
into Aristotelian science, a debate raged over whether mathematical demonstration 
can achieve the status of the requirements of the knowledge of causes set out in the 
Posterior  Analytics.54  Two  kinds  of  demonstrations  in  the  foundational  sections  of 
Euclid’s Elements presented a barrier to geometry’s inclusion into Aristotelian science. 
These  are  Euclid’s  frequent  use  of  indirect  or  apagogic  proofs  and  proofs  by 
superposition. Taking up the problem of apagogic demonstrations, late Renaissance 
mathematicians faced the problem that these indirect proofs mean that a theorem is 
demonstrated only in view of the absurdity of its contrary and not in view of its 
(Aristotelian)  cause.  Of  course  not  everyone  accepted  this  view  and,  as  Mancosu 
carefully lays out, these were those who defended geometry on the basis of its direct 
proofs  while  qualifying  the  indirect  proofs  as  heuristic,  others  defended  indirect 
proofs as causal and still others who argued that the progress of geometry can deliver 
direct proofs for those results that are only temporarily given as indirect proofs.55  
  The inheritance of this debate still deeply influenced the exchange between 
Guldin and Cavalieri and it was still the form of demonstration that framed the rise of 
these debates about infinitesimal or indivisiblist methods. There is thus no surprise 
that Archimedes served as an important figure of contestation in this context precisely 
because his method of exhaustion involved both a (double) apagogic demonstration 
and an appeal to infinitesimals. To rectify this context of the question of mathematical 
rigor, Mancosu will emphasize that,  “What is new in the seventeenth century is the  
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effort  on  the  part  of  several  first-rate  mathematicians  to  grant  these  heuristic 
techniques a formal validity.”56     
  The  unification  of  heuristic  infinitesimal  techniques,  dating  back  to 
Archimedes, and formal validity in the ideal of direct proof, under the influence of the 
standard of Aristotelian science, provided the grounding problems of rigor confronted 
by 17th century mathematicians including Descartes and Leibniz. This perspective can 
help us gain some distance from the standard reconstruction of the 17th century as 
characterized simply by the destiny of Koyré’s “infinite universe.” This perspective 
also helps cast a proper light on what is indeed “spinosissima” about Leibniz’s proof 
above.  
  As Mancosu points out in his analysis of Quadratura, “Leibniz seems to be 
involved in a vicious circle. He asserts that the justification for infinitely small or large 
quantities can only be given using proof by reductio; then he claims that only by using 
infinitely small or large quantities can one give direct proofs.”57 In what we have noted 
earlier, Leibniz’s argument in the Quadratura is balanced on the fulcrum of the form of 
demonstration.  According  to  the  ideal  of  direct  demonstration,  the  finitude  of 
Leibniz’s demonstration does not fully qualify it as rigorous. Although understood as 
less  rigorous  than  a  direct  method,  Leibniz  remained  closer  to  an  Archimedean 
method, or, as Levey puts it, a Neo-Archimedean method. Leibniz can be understood 
as innovative in this respect on its own rights but we are far from qualifying this 
argument as “rigorous” within Leibniz’s own context. No doubt, this is precisely why 
Leibniz considered his demonstration as “thorny.”  
  In this context what I have emphasized as corresponding to the question of 
rigor is, as Mancosu has convincingly argued, an epoch defining debate surrounding 
the form of proof. In this light, we see that Leibniz’s argument was balanced on a 
fulcrum between methodological rigor and the admission of limit-like infinitesimal 
fictions. As we have seen, methodological rigor demanded the admission of these 
infinitesimal fictions. Here, a focus on what was, for Leibniz, the problem of rigor 
reveals a picture that is quite different from what we might expect. That is, limit-like 
infinitesimal fictions were introduced for the sake of rigor rather than at the cost of 
rigor. This observation is more capable to rendering apparent what was truly brilliant 
about  Leibniz’s  approach  to  quadrature  and  his  development  of  the  differential 
calculus. As such, to read the Quadratura along the lines of rigor is indeed to underline 
its brilliant use of indirect proof and his innovative notion of equality rather than that 
of the uses of infinitesimals. On this same point, Levey quite correctly notes that, 
“Leibniz’s demonstration of Prop. 6 is ‘rigorous’ in the modern sense of involving 
only finite quantities; it makes no reference to infinite or infinitely small values.”58 The 
attempt to judge (and vindicate) the rigor of Leibniz’s Quadratura along the lines of his 
prudential use of the infinitesimal qua fictions, reducible to finite terms, is a judgment 
made from a modern perspective.  
  What is equivocal in reading the Quadratura is the equivocation of what it 
means for Leibniz to put forth rigor in mathematical method. It turns out that what 
we seek with the notion of rigor does not correspond to Leibniz’s own concern with 
rigor. Leibniz’s concern was more wary of the form of demonstration, rather than  
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being a direct concern about the reality of the infinitesimal. The risk, as Leibniz, saw 
it,  concerned  his  real  innovation  in  his  form  of  proof  and  his  treatment  of  the 
constructive aspect of his demonstration. As such, the emphasis on suggesting that 
Leibniz does not employ anything other than finite terms in his argument can only be 
said to conform to a modern and contemporary way of thinking about rigor. This 
distinction  between  how  the  question  of  mathematical  rigor  was  expressed  in 
Leibniz’s time and how it is conceived in our time provides reason to understand what 
is equivocal in the search for the foundations of Leibniz’s infinitesimal fictions.  
  By highlighting the different senses of the question of rigor between Leibniz 
and our time, I do not wish to simply efface the problem of the infinitesimal. As other 
commentators have shown in sufficient measure, Leibniz simply did not engage in the 
treatment  of  infinitesimals  as  actual  and  hence  did  not  in  any  case  tempt  the 
contradictions concerning the infinite and infinitesimal that had been well established 
since Zeno’s time. Reading the problem of Leibniz’s infinitesimal fiction in the light of 
this emphasis on the distinction between concerns of rigor and metaphysical questions 
helps  us  grasp  why Leibniz  will  insist,  later  in  his  life,  that  mathematical  method 
should  not  depend  on  metaphysics.  The  corollary  of  this  assertion  is  then  that 
mathematical  method  does  not  directly  entail,  except  perhaps  in  providing  some 
conceptual limits, anything about the metaphysics of infinitesimals. Now, we are far 
from  saying  that  Leibniz  still  held  on  to  something  like  an  actual  indivisible  or 
infinitesimal.  Yet  looking  at  the  meaning  of  the  fictional  infinitesimal  from  this 
standpoint  does  cause  some  hesitation  in  accepting  a  full  reduction  of  fictional 
infinitesimals qua abrégé to merely finite terms. It is only from a retrospective approach 
that this focus even makes much sense.  
 
Conclusion 
 As I have mentioned briefly above, Leibniz’s short and youthful romance 
with actual infinitesimals in the form of indivisibles in his considerations of bodies in 
motion was definitively over around the time of his reading notes on Galileo in 1672. 
In this, Leibniz’s texts after this period showed a sharp terminological change toward 
a  “fictional”  infinitesimal  and  eventually  an  unequivocal  syncategorematic 
determination  of  the  infinite  and  infinitesimal.  Simply  grasping  this  turn  and  this 
determination of the infinite and infinitesimal however does not, as I have argued, 
shed  much  light  on  their  meaning  and  their  role  in  Leibniz’s  mathematics  and 
metaphysics. The drive to vindicate Leibniz from accusations of holding something 
like an actual infinite and infinitesimal quantity, magnitude or unit has led to a purely 
reductive  reading  of  the  syncategorematic  infinitesimal  to  the  finite.  While  this 
judgment is legitimate in some respects, it is limited in its capacity to address a number 
of  different  uses  of  the  infinite  and  infinitesimal  (understood  as  strictly 
syncategorematic) in his general thought. More problematically however, the focus on 
this vindication of Leibniz had occluded an appreciation for Leibniz’s own reflections 
on the role and use of fictional infinitesimals. The result is a series of equivocations 
concerning the foundations and rigor of these infinitesimal fictions.   
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In my critique of Ishiguro, I have pointed to the error in reducing Leibniz’s 
fictional infinitesimals to a general treatment of mathematical objects as such. The 
qualification  of  infinitesimals  as  “fiction”  is  employed  precisely  to  distinguish  his 
syncategorematical  infinitesimal  from  other  mathematical  terms.  The  logicist 
framework employed by Ishiguro simply cannot accommodate these complexities and 
lands  her  in  an  empty  judgment  of  Leibniz’s  infinitesimals.  In  short,  if  all 
mathematical  terms  are  made  through  contextual  reference,  the  use  of  contextual 
reference  neither  adds  anything  to  our  understanding  of  Leibniz’s  admission  of 
infinitesimal  methods  nor  allows  us  to  understand  the  difference  marked  by  the 
“fictional” nature of these terms. I argued that a closer look at the original framework 
of Leibniz’s infinitesimal method in the problem of quadrature reveals that Leibniz 
faced a problem of rigor and justification that was at a certain distance from this 
debate between actual and fictional infinitesimal. In any case, Leibniz already clearly 
rejected anything like an actual infinitesimal entity. The complexity of his fictional 
infinitesimal is only fully appreciated through its role in the improvement that he 
brought to an Archimedean style argument for the problem of quadrature. The drive 
to  focus  on  the  reducibility  of  infinitesimal  fictions  in  this  demonstration  in  the 
Quadratura occludes what Leibniz saw as the problem in this same demonstration. In 
turn,  we  see  that  the  problem  that  concerned  Leibniz  from  the  perspective  of  a 
“toolbox” conception of the foundation of these infinitesimal fictions brings much 
more complexity with regard to the role that such fictions play. This purely reductive 
view of infinitesimals overshadows the constraints that Leibniz saw himself as facing 
and overcoming in his quadrature method. 
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explain the transition from finite to infinitesimal magnitudes’ in his consideration of the ratio 
between dx and dy. As we saw, there are no actual infinitesimal magnitudes. There are only 
finite magnitudes which we can take as small as we wish.  The quotient dy/dx is defined, 
nevertheless, for all the values of dx, fictiously including the limit.” Ishiguro, H. (1990), 95. 
29 Please keep in mind that this interpretation of  “incomparability” is Ishiguro’s. She argues, 
“Often  when  Leibniz  uses  the  word  ‘incomparable’,  he  is  …  thinking  in  the  line  of  the 
traditional notion of incomparable non-homogenous quantities […] For example, the length of 
a line and an area of a plane could not, it was thought, be compared with each other since 
entities of different dimensions were said not to have homogeneous quantities.” In the same 
argument Ishiguro continues to qualify that Leibniz’s notion of what is homogeneous does not 
directly  dependent  on  geometrical  intuitions  of  dimensionality  but  on  a  logical  distinction 
between things that are comparable and things that are not. As such, Ishiguro argues that 
nothing can be “incomparably” larger or smaller since larger or smaller already assume some 
notion  of  comparability.  Ishiguro  then  concludes,  “[A]dding  a  line  to  a  surface  does  not 
increase the surface, but this is surely not because the line is incomparably smaller than any 
surface.” Ishiguro, H. (1990), 88.   
30 Ishiguro, H. (1990), 90; Leibniz, G.W., Philosophical Papers and Letters, 546.  
31 Ishiguro, H. (1990), 90; Leibniz, G.W., Philosophical Papers and Letters, 543.  
32 Ishiguro, H. (1990), 90; Leibniz, G.W., Philosophical Papers and Letters, 92.  
33 Ishiguro, H. (1990), 90; Leibniz, G.W., Philosophical Papers and Letters, 92. 
34 Bos’s landmark work in evaluating Leibniz’s calculus is one of the many sources arguing that 
Leibniz never held a limit concept of the infinite and infinitesimal. While I do not employ 
Bos’s  comparison  of  Leibniz’s  calculus  and  modern  calculus  undertaken  in  “Differentials, 
higher-order differentials and the derivative in the Leibnizian Calculus,” he has argued here 
and elsewhere that Leibniz’s calculus stands on its own and does not require later mathematical 
developments to either vindicate or reappraise it. In this same article, he attempts to provide 
two  different  ways  of  reading  “foundation”  in  Leibniz’s  methods  for  the  calculus.  He 
distinguishes between the use of the differential algorithm through the infinite series and the 
use  of  infinitesimals  as  entities.  While  I  do  hold  these  two  sorts  of  justifications  or 
“foundations”  apart,  Bos’s  fundamental  argument  in  this  text  argues  that  Leibniz’s 
development of the method of the calculus is rooted in the “extrapolation” of the infinite and 
infinitesimal from the finite case. While Bos does note that Leibniz’s legacy left the status of 
the terms of his calculus open to misinterpretation in its lack of a foundation, he also notes 
that Leibniz was careful not to treat his infinite and infinitesimal terms as independent definite 
entities. He warns, “The common concern of historians with the difficulties connected with 
the infinite smallness of differentials has distracted attention from the fact that in the practice 
of the Leibnizian calculus, differentials as single entities hardly ever occur. The differentials are 
ranged in sequences along the axes, the curve and the domains of the other variables; they are 
variables,  themselves  depending  on  the  other  variables  involved  in  the  problem,  and  this 
dependence is studied in terms of differential equations.” (Bos, H.J.M. (1974), 17).See also Bos, 
H.J.M, “The Fundamental Concepts of the Leibnizian Calculus,” in Lectures in the History of 
Mathematics (Providence, RI: American Mathematical Society, 1993), 83-99.  
35 Ishiguro, H. (1990), 96.   
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36 Ishiguro, H. (1990), 98.  
37 Ishiguro, H. (1990), 100. 
38  My  use  of  Ishiguro  as  a  repre sentative  of  a  “reductive”  reading  of  Leibniz’s 
syncategorematical infinite may appear to create a strawman argument insofar as it does not 
reflect more current Leibniz research. This is partly true but my aim here is to criticize the 
logicist  means  by  which  Leibniz’s  infinitesimals  are  approached  rather  than  to  mistake 
Ishiguro’s particular argument here for current Leibniz research. A number of articles by H. 
Breger, R. Arthur, S. Levey, D. Garber and D. Rutherford which have informed the research 
of this article have employed the notion of the syncategorematic infinite and infinitesimal in a 
non-reductive way that supports or is at least consistent with my approach. For the sake of 
brevity,  these  articles  are  not  discussed  here.  Yet  in  Ishiguro  we  find  not  only  a  highly 
influential but also a generalized approach to Leibniz’s philosophy through the notion that 
logic constitutes a foundation for metaphysics, epistemology and mathematics. The general 
aim to demonstrate the flaws of a logicist reading of Leibniz which feeds into a number of 
different interpretations is  hence not a strawman. Rather,  an explicit denial of the logicist 
means  of  framing  the  question  of  the  role  of  Leibniz’s  (syncategorematic)  infinite  and 
infinitesimal is needed to explicitly create a context where these terms are balanced between 
metaphysical, epistemological and mathematical considerations.  
39 Benaceraff, P., “What numbers could not be”, The Philosophical Review, 74,1 (Jan 1965): 47-73. 
40  Marquis,  J.P.,  “Category  Theory  and  the  Foundations  of  Mathematics:  Philosophical 
Excavations”, Synthese 103, 3 (1995): 421-447. 
41 The first 7 propositions of the  Quadratura lay out a first methodological layer that Leibniz 
uses as a point of departure to other problems in his mathematical treatise of 51 propositions. 
Much  later  in  the  treatise,  Leibniz  uses  this  first  layer  of  constructions  and  arguments  to 
develop (in proposition 48) a formulation of the famous alternating infinite series (for π/4). My 
reading of the Quadratura is largely informed by Eberhard Knobloch, Marc Parmentier and 
David Rabouin. Cf. Knobloch, E., “Generality and Infinitely Small Quantities in Leibniz’s 
Mathematics  –The  Case  of  his  Arithmetical  Quadrature  of  Conic  Sections  and  Related 
Curves”, in Infinitesimal Differences, ed. U.  Goldenbaum and D. Jesseph,  (Berlin/New  York: 
Walter de Gruyter, 2008), 171-183;Parmentier, M., “Démonstrations et infiniment petits dans 
la Quadratura arithmetica de Leibniz”, Revue d’histoire des sciences, 54, 3 (2001): 275-289; Rabouin, 
D., “Infini mathématique et infini métaphysique: D’un bon usage de Leibniz pour lire Cues (... 
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